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Abstract—Firecracker is a virtualization technology that makes
use of Kernel Virtual Machine (KVM). Firecracker belongs to
a new virtualization class named the micro-virtual machines
(MicroVMs). Using Firecracker, we can launch lightweight Mi-
croVMs in non-virtualized environments in a fraction of a second,
at the same time offering the security and workload isolation
provided by traditional VMs and also the resource efficiency that
comes along with containers [1]. Firecracker aims to provide a
slimmed-down MicroVM, comprised of approximately 50K lines
of code in Rust and with a reduced attack surface for guest
VMs. This report will examine the internals of Firecracker and
understand why Firecracker is the next big thing going forward
in virtualization and cloud computing.
Index Terms—firecracker, microvm, Rust, VMM, QEMU,
KVM
I. INTRODUCTION
Firecracker is a new open source Virtual Machine Monitor
(VMM) developed by AWS for serverless workloads. It is a
virtualization technology which makes use of KVM, meaning
it can only be run on KVM-supported and enabled hosts and
a corresponding Linux Kernel v4.14+. With the recommended
Linux kernel guest configuration, Firecracker claims to offer
a memory overhead of less than 5MB per container, boots to
application code within 125ms, and allows for the creation of
up to 150 MicroVMs per second. The number of Firecracker
MicroVMs running simultaneously on a single host is only
limited by the availability of hardware resources. [1]
Firecracker provides security and resource isolation by run-
ning the Firecracker userpsace process inside a jailer process.
The jailer sets up system resources that require elevated
permissions (e.g., cgroup, chroot), drops privileges, and then
exec()s into the Firecracker binary, which then runs as an
unprivileged process. Past this point, Firecracker can only
access resources to which a privileged third-party grants access
(e.g., by copying a file into the chroot, or passing a file
descriptor). [13]
Seccomp filters limit the system calls that the Firecracker
process can use. There are 3 possible levels of seccomp
filtering, configurable by passing a command line argument
to the jailer: 0 (disabled), 1 (whitelists a set of trusted system
calls by their identifiers) and 2 (whitelists a set of trusted
system calls with trusted parameter values), the latter being
the most restrictive and the recommended one. The filters
are loaded in the Firecracker process, immediately before the
execution of the untrusted guest code starts. [13]
Firecracker was developed to handle serverless workloads
and has been running in production for AWS Lambda and
Fargate since 2018. Serverless workloads require isolation
and security, and at the same time, have container benefits
of faster boot time. A lot of research has been done with
respect to the cold-start and warm-start of the VM instances
for serverless workloads. [17] The idea behind developing
Firecracker was to make use of the KVM module loaded in
the Linux kernel and get rid of the legacy devices that other
virtualization technologies like Xen and VMWare offer. This
way, Firecracker can create a VMM with a smaller memory
footprint and also provide improved performance.
Section 2 explains the high-level architecture of the Fire-
cracker Micro VM, Section 3 dives deep into the boot se-
quence of the Firecracker, Section 4 describes the device
model emulation provided, and Section 5 shares some light
on the conclusions garnered through this study.
II. ARCHITECTURE OF FIRECRACKER
KVM is an enabler of hardware extensions provided by
vendors such as Intel and AMD with their virtualization
extensions such as SVM and VMX. These extensions allow
KVM to directly execute the guest code on the host CPU.
There are three sets of ioctls that make up the KVM API and
are issued to control the various aspects of the virtual machine.
The three classes that the iocltls belongs to are [7] -
• System IOCTLs: These query and set global attributes,
which affect the whole KVM subsystem. In addition, a
system ioctl is used to create virtual machines.
• VM IOCTLs: These query and set attributes that affect
an entire virtual machinefor example, memory layout.
In addition, a VM ioctl is used to create virtual CPUs
(vCPUs). VM ioctls are run from the same userspace
process (address space) that was used to create the VM.
• vCPU IOCTLs: These query and set attributes that
control the operation of a single virtual CPU. They run
vCPU ioctls from the same thread that was used to create
the vCPU.
QEMU is an open source machine emulator and a virtualiza-
tion technique to run KVM-enabled Virtual Machines. Similar
to QEMU, Firecracker uses a multithreaded event-driven ar-
chitecture. Each Firecracker process runs one and only one
MicroVM. The process consists of three main threads: API,
VMM and vCPU. The API server thread is an HTTP server
that is created to accept requests and performs actions on those
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Fig. 1. Firecracker Design - Threads
requests. The API server thread structure comprises of a socket
connection to listen to requests on the port, epoll fd to listen to
events on the socket port, and a hashmap of connections. The
hashmap consists of token and connection pairs corresponding
to the file descriptor of the streamin this case, the socket.
Traditionally, QEMU has made use of select or poll system
calls to maintain an event loop of file descriptors on which
to listen for new events. [16] select or poll system calls
requires a list of all open file descriptors maintained in the
VMM structure and then it would go through each of the file
descriptors to determine which FDs have new events. This
would take up O(N) time where N is the number of file
descriptors to listen for new events. [14]
Firecracker takes the epoll approach where the host kernel
maintains a list of file descriptors for VM process and notifies
the VMM whenever there is a new event that occurs in any
of the file descriptors. This is called as a Edge Triggered
mechanism (”pull”), whereas the select/poll was a Level
Triggered mechanism (”push”). The epoll fd structure created
by Firecracker has the ‘close on exec‘ flag set, which means
if a process forks the Firecracker process, the file descriptors
would not be shared.
The API server exposes a number of requests as REST
APIs which can be used to configure the MicroVM. Once
the MicroVM has been started, i.e., once it receives the
”InstanceStart” command, the API server thread will just
block on the epoll file descriptor until new events come in.
Firecracker creates a channel (see Rust channels) to enable
communication between the API Server thread and the VMM
thread. Rust channels are similar to Unix pipes for comparison.
The VMM server thread manages the entire MicroVM.
Once the VMM server thread is created, it runs an event
loop which takes the parsed request one by one from the API
server thread and dispatches it to the appropriate handlers. The
handlers are defined according to the dispatch table set by
the event loop. For now, Firecracker supports the following
handlers - Exit, Stdin, DeviceHandler, VMMActionRequest,
WriteMetrics. The dispatch table is managed by the epoll fd.
The dispatch table maintains a map of file descriptors that
are to be monitored, and the kind of events to be monitored
for. When the vCPU thread creation request is received by
the VMM thread, the VMM spawns the required number of
vCPU by using the KVM vCPU ioctls. A vCPU thread is
created for each virtual CPU. These vCPU threads are nothing
but POSIX threads created by KVM. To run guest code, the
vCPUs execute an ioctl with KVM RUN as its argument.
Software in the root mode is the hypervisor. Hypervisor
or the VMM forms a new plane that runs in root mode
while the VMs run in non-root mode. KVM uses virtualization
extensions to provide these different modes on the host CPUs.
In the case of Intel CPUs, VT-x is the CPU virtualization and
VT-d is the IO virtualization. For vCPUs, VT-x provides two
modes of guest code execution: root and non-root. Whenever
a VM attempts to execute an instruction that is prohibited
by the non-root model, vCPU immediately switches to a
root mode in a trap-like way. This is called a VMEXIT.
Hypervisor deals with the reason for VMEXIT and then
executes VMRESUME to re-enter non-root mode for that VM
instance. This interaction between root and non-root is the
essence of hardware virtualization.
III. FIRECRACKER BOOT SEQUENCE
Traditional PCs boot Linux with a BIOS and a bootloader.
The primary responsibilities of the BIOS includes booting
the CPU in real mode and performing a Power on Self Test
(POST) setup before loading the bootloader. BIOS determines
the candidates for boot devices, and once a bootable device
is found, the bootloader is loaded into RAM and executed.
Different systems have different stages of the bootloader to
be executed. LILO, for example, has a two stage bootloader
while GRUB contains a 3 stage bootloader. Multiple stages
of a bootloader are used because of the system limitations of
some of the older devices that were used to boot Linux.
Linux kernels actually do not require a BIOS and a boot-
loader. Instead, Firecracker uses what is known as Linux Boot
Protocol. [15] There are multiple versions of the Linux Boot
Protocol standard that exist. Firecracker follows the 64-bit
Linux Boot Protocol Standard. Thus, Firecracker can directly
load the Linux kernel and mount the corresponding root file
system.
The Linux kernel is an uncompressed bzImage (big com-
pressed image, usually larger than 512KB). The bzImage
format consists of a real mode kernel code and a protected
mode kernel code. Instead of booting into the entry point
defined by the real mode, Firecracker directly boots into the
64-bit entry point located at 0x200 in the protected mode
kernel code. Firecracker loads the uncompressed Linux kernel
as well as the init process, thereby saving approximately 20
to 30ms of the time taken to decompress the kernel.
Linux kernel also contains another component, namely the
initramfs [5]. There are four primary reasons to have an
initramfs in the LFS environment: loading the rootfs from
a network, loading it from an LVM logical volume, having
an encrypted rootfs where a password is required, or for the
convenience of specifying the rootfs as a LABEL or UUID.
Anything else usually means that the kernel was not configured
properly.
Since Firecracker doesn’t need any of the above stated
reasons for loading the initramfs before mounting the root
˜ ˜
| Protected-mode kernel |
100000 +------------------------+
| I/O memory hole |
0A0000 +------------------------+
| Reserved for BIOS | Leave as much as possible unused
˜ ˜
| Command line | (Can also be below the X+10000 mark)
X+10000 +------------------------+
| Stack/heap | For use by the kernel real-mode code.
X+08000 +------------------------+
| Kernel setup | The kernel real-mode code.
| Kernel boot sector | The kernel legacy boot sector.
X +------------------------+
| Boot loader | <- Boot sector entry point 0000:7C00
001000 +------------------------+
| Reserved for MBR/BIOS |
000800 +------------------------+
| Typically used by MBR |
000600 +------------------------+
| BIOS use only |
000000 +------------------------+
Fig. 2. Linux BzImage Memory Layout
file system, it is recommended to avoid loading the initramfs
at boot time, thereby further reducing the overall boot time
and the memory footprint for the kernel. So, if no initramfs is
configured externally, then at boot time, Firecracker replaces
the initramfs with a default empty, 134 byte initramfs.
IV. FIRECRACKER DEVICE MODEL
Until this section, we have talked about the similar architec-
tures and execution flow for Firecracker and QEMU. So, what
is different between QEMU and Firecracker? One of the main
differences is with the device emulations. There are only 5
Device emulations available in Firecracker: network, block de-
vices, sockets, serial console and minimal keyboard controller,
as shown in Figure 3. Firecracker does not provide support for
device emulations like USB, GPU and 9P filesystem in order
to provide increased security compared to other virtualization
technologies like QEMU. On the other hand, QEMU has most
device model emulations available in the VMM. The careful
reader will notice that Firecracker does not the use the vhost
implementation in the host kernel that provides more efficient
IO performance without doing VMEXITS.
An open specification for emulating device models in virtu-
alization has been developed, named Virtio. Virtio is defined
as a straightforward, efficient and a standard mechanism to
allow guest OS to talk to the virtual device driver in a similar
way the host OS would call the actual hardware device driver.
It takes advantage of the fact that the guest can share memory
with the host for IO.
The general flow for the virtio specification [8] includes a
front-end driver representing the virtual device in the guest,
and the corresponding device being exposed by the hyper-
visor or the VMM. A transport layer enables communication
between the host and the guest. For the transport layers, Virtio
employs a ring-buffer virtqueue structure. A virtuqueue is a
queue of guest-allocated buffers that the host interacts with
either by reading or writing to them. Each device can have
zero or more virtqueues. A back-end driver present in the
host kernel completes the communication flow, to which the
virtqueue is connected.
Firecracker device model architecture using Virtio is shown
in Figure 3. The following list provides a description of the
devices available within Firecracker:
• virtio-net: implementation for the network driver (tun/tap
devices)
• virtio-blk: implementation for the block devices
• virtio-vsock: implementation for VM sockets providing
N:1 serial communications
• serial console: implementation for the legacy console
devices for serial communication - terminal
• keyboard controller: implementation for the keyboard
device, though only one function is implemented -
Ctrl+Alt+Del to reboot/shutdown the system.
V. SCOPE FOR IMPROVEMENTS
Even with all the excellent features providing near-native
performance of the guest code using KVM, as well as faster
boot times and lower memory footprint of the VMs due
to fewer support for available device emulations, there still
exist some areas for improvements that can make Firecracker
Fig. 3. Firecracker Device Model
more suitable for general use cases and not just for serverless
workloads.
• Support for virtio-fs: virto-fs is the interface to provide
efficient sharing between the host and the guest filesystem
avoiding context switches (VMEXITS) thereby providing
more performance. virtio-fs is an upgrade on the existing
virtio-9p interface for the same purpose. Though more
research is required for security purposes before including
it as part of Firecracker.
• Increased IO Performance: The results of the tests
performed between the Firecracker, QEMU and Cloud
Hypervisor show limitations in Firecracker’s virtio im-
plementation and serial execution. [1] [2]
• Larger number of device emulations: Currently, Fire-
cracker can emulate only 10 devices, since each device
gets its own IRQ. [10]
• Support for attaching devices at runtime: Firecracker
only allows specifying the devices at booting time. De-
vices can only be attached when the MicroVM is shut
down.
• Hotplugging Support: For any workload, it is beneficial
to allow guest memory/CPU hotplugging within a VM
at runtime in order to avoid interference to the workload.
Firecracker oversubscribes the allocated memory required
for the guest, but there is no way to expand the allocated
memory for the guest.
• Memory Ballooning Support: At present, Firecracker
does not have any support for reclaiming unused mem-
ory from the guest, since no communication is present
between the host and the guest. This, along with the hot-
plugging feature would make it very easy to dynamically
add/remove memory/CPU at runtime thereby providing
elasticity to the MicroVM. [9]
VI. CONCLUSION/THOUGHTS
This paper reviews the implementation of a minimalist and
modular VMM in the form of Firecracker MicroVM. It also
identifies the process of how Firecracker provides resource
isolation and security through the use of seccomp filters and
jailer process and provides faster boot times and lower memory
footprint due to KVM and minimal device model emulation.
One other thing to note is that Firecracker embodies the
modular design in the development of the hypervisor. The
modular design approach has also led to the development of
community-driven high-quality rust-vmm crates which pro-
vide us with the core modules required for the implementation
of a hypervisor [11]. rust-vmm [12] is a community approach
initiated by AWS. Amazon along with Intel, Redhat and
Google, are trying to provide a platform to build a hypervisor
from scratch by only consuming the modules required from the
rust-vmm crates. This approach also enables the development
of a plug-n-play architecture in hypervisors, which we haven’t
seen so far.
REFERENCES
[1] https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/firecracker-lightweight-virtualization-for-serverless-computing
[2] Alexandru Agache, Marc Brooker, Andreea Florescu, Alexandra Ior-
dache, Anthony Liguori, Rolf Neugebauer, Phil Piwonka, and Diana-
Maria Popa https://www.usenix.org/system/files/nsdi20-paper-agache.
pdf Firecracker: Lightweight Virtualization for Serverless Applications
[3] https://unixism.net/2019/10/how-aws-firecracker-works-a-deep-dive/
[4] https://developer.ibm.com/technologies/linux/articles/l-linuxboot/
[5] http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/view/cvs/postlfs/initramfs.html
[6] Swift Birth and Quick Death: Enabling Fast ParallelGuest Boot and
Destruction in the Xen Hypervisor https://ssrg.ece.vt.edu/papers/vee
2017.pdf
[7] Mastering KVM Virtualization by Prasad Mukhedkar; Humble
Devassy Chirammal; Anil Vettathu https://learning.oreilly.com/library/
view/mastering-kvm-virtualization/9781784399054/ch02s04.html
[8] Deep Dive into virtio and vhost-net driver https://www.redhat.com/en/
blog/deep-dive-virtio-networking-and-vhost-net
[9] Memory Ballooning Support https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/
firecracker/issues/1571
[10] Enable IRQ Sharing to remove current limit of 10 devices https://github.
com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/issues/1268
[11] Building virtualization stack for the future https://opensource.com/
article/19/3/rust-virtual-machine
[12] rust-vmm https://github.com/rust-vmm
[13] Firecracker Design Doc https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/
firecracker/blob/master/docs/design.md
[14] Understand epoll and its madness https://medium.com/@copyconstruct/
the-method-to-epolls-madness-d9d2d6378642
[15] Linux 64-bit Boot Protocol https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/x86/
boot.html#id1
[16] QEMU Internals http://blog.vmsplice.net/2011/03/
qemu-internals-overall-architecture-and.html
[17] Cold Start/Warm Start with AWS Lambda https://blog.octo.com/en/
cold-start-warm-start-with-aws-lambda/
